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Do EVA ™ Adopters Outperform their Industry Peers? 
Evidence from Security Analyst Earnings Forecasts 
INTRODUCTION 
Economic-value-added (EVA™)\ developed by 
the consulting firm of Stern Stewart & Co. is a 
corporate financial performance measurement and 
management system which has grown in popularity 
both within and outside the United States in the 
1990s.2 Prominent corporate and journalistic support­
ers of EV A ™, Fortunemagazine in particular, laud it as 
the holy grail of corporate performance management 
and measurement. Many authors, however, point to 
the shortcomings and implementation concerns of 
EVA ™ (Brewer, Chandra, and Hock, 1999; Bowen and 
Wallace, 1999; Chen and Dodd, 1997; Delves, 1999; 
Dodd and Johns, 1999) or view it merely as a variation 
of the older accounting concept of residual income 
(Dodd and Johns, 1999). 
There has been a growing literature examining the 
effectiveness of EVA TM adoption. However, this has 
been mainly in the form of case studies and reports 
that document the improved financial performance 
resulting from EVA 1M adoption at individual firms 
(see e.g., Grant, 1997, Ehrbar, 1998). To date, there is 
little systematic evidence on the effect of EVA TM 
adoption across larger samples of firms. A notable 
exception is an in-house study reported upon by 
Ehrbar, 1999, and by Stern Stewart and Co. on their 
corporate web site (www.sternstewart.com). Com­
paring sixty-seven adopters of the EVA TM system with 
their peers, matched on industry and size, Stern 
Stewart reports that the adopters outperformed the 
non-adopter peers in terms of stock returns over a 
period up to five years after adoption. Closer 
James J. Cordeiro and D. Donald Kent, Jr. 
examination of these findings however, reveals that in 
any given year following adoption, between 34-50% of 
EVA ™ adopters underperform their peers. Thus, for a 
given firm, it is not clear that the adoption of EVA ™ 
comes even close to guaranteeing performance 
improvements. 
The purpose of the present study is to re-examine 
the link between EVA ™ adoption and firm perfor­
mance, using security analyst earnings forecasts. 
These forecasts, we argue, function as a proxy for firm 
performance that usefully supplements other ac­
counting and stock market measures. We begin by 
reviewing some of the literature on EVA™, noting 
claims for strengths and weaknesses of that perfor­
mance measure and management system. We then 
make the case for why security analyst earnings 
forecasts are a useful performance measure for testing 
the performance effects of EVA TM adoption. We test 
our hypothesis using Stern Stewart's sample of firms 
in 1997. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Background on EV ATM 
EVA TM is defined as the excess of the dollar 
amount of net operating profit after tax (NOP AT) over 
the dollar charge for capital (both debt and equity) 
obtained by multiplying the percentage weighted­
average cost of capital (W ACC). This arguably 
approximates economic performance better than 
traditional accounting measures such as return on 
assets since it measures the dollar return in a given 
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year above the minimum rate required to compensate 
investors for risk on capital investments. The EVA ™ 
system marketed by Stem Stewart makes a number of 
"equity adjustments" that transform accounting book 
value into a more accurate measure of at-risk cash 
called economic book value as part of the EVA ™ 
calculation. It is important to note that EV ATM is more 
than just a performance measurement system. It is also 
marketed as a motivational, compensation-based 
management system that facilitates economic activity 
and accountability at all levels in the firm. 
Stem Stewart (1999) reports that companies that 
have adopted EVA™ have outperformed their 
competitors when compared on the basis of 
comparable market capitalization. Several advan­
tages claimed for EVA TM are: 
� EV N"M eliminates economic distortions of 
GAAP to focus decisions on real eco­
nomic results 
� EVATM provides for better assessment of 
decisions that affect the balance sheet and 
income statement or tradeoffs between 
each through the use of the capital charge 
against NOP AT 
� EV NM decouples bonus plans from 
budgetary targets 
� EVA TM covers all aspects of the manage­
rial cycle 
� EVA TM aligns and speeds decision mak­
ing, and enhances communication and 
teamwork 
Academic researchers have argued for the 
following additional benefits: 
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� goal congruence of managerial and 
shareholder goals achieved by tying 
compensation of managers and other 
employees to EV A™ measures (Dierks & 
Patel, 1997) 
� better goal congruence than ROI (Brewer, 
Chandra, & Hock, 1999) 
� transformation of employees into entre­
preneurs via incentive-compensation 
plans 
� annual performance measured tied to 
executive compensation 
� provision of correct incentives for capital 
allocations (Booth, 1997) 
� long-term performance that is not com­
promised in favor of short-term results 
(Booth, 1997) 
� improvement in corporate environmen­
tal performance (Epstein & Young, 1998) 
� provision of significant information value 
beyond traditional accounting measures 
of EPS, ROA and ROE (Chen & Dodd, 
1997) 
EVA ™ also has its critics. Brewer , Chandra, & 
Hock (1999) cite the following limitations to EV A™: 
� EVA ™ does not control for size differ­
ences across plants or divisions 
� EVA TM is based on financial accounting 
methods that can be manipulated by 
managers 
� EVA ™ may focus on immediate results 
which diminishes innovation 
� EVA ™ provides information that is 
obvious but offers no solutions in much 
the same way as historical financial 
statements do 
Brewer et al (1999) recommend using other 
performance measures along with EVA ™ and suggest 
the balanced scorecard system. Other researchers 
have noted that EVA ™ does not correlate as strongly 
with stock returns as its proponents claim. Chen and 
Dodd (1997) reported a high correlation between stock 
returns and EV ATM variables, but that only 20% of the 
variation in stock return could be explained by 
average EVA™ per share and none of the other 
variables tested accounted for more than 26% of that 
variation. They also found that, while EVA TM provides 
significant information value, other accounting profit 
measures also provide significant information and 
should not be discarded iri favor of EVA™ alone. 
Biddle, Bowen &Wallace (1997) found only marginal 
information content beyond earnings and suggest a 
greater association of earnings with returns and firm 
values than EVA ™, residual income, or cash flow from 
operations. 
In a survey of top management with accounting 
responsibilities, Dodd and Johns (1999) found a 
difference in usage of nonfinancial measures between 
EVA ™ adopters and non-adopters. They suggest that 
?EVA ™ adopters are de-emphasizing measures of 
effectiveness (quality) and adaptability (customer 
satisfaction)(ibid. p.17). They also point out that this 
trend toward remote management by financial 
numbers alone is occurring perhaps without compa­
nies even knowing it and that using a single financial 
measure of corporate performance is inappropriate 
for today's environment. 
Finally, a key criticism of EV ATM is that it is simply 
a retreaded model of residual income and that the 
large number of" equity adjustments" incorporated in 
the Stern Stewart system may not be neccesary 
(Barfield, 1998; Chen & Dodd, 1997; OHanlon & 
Peasnell, 1998; Young, 1997). The similarity between 
EVA ™ and residual income is supported by Chen and 
Dodd (1997) who note that most of the EVA™ and 
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residual income variables are highly correlated and 
are almost identical in terms of association to stock 
return. 
Managers in firms that are thinking about 
adopting EV ATM will reasonably want to know 
whether it is merely a fad or has long-term 
performance improvement advantages. On balance, it 
is hard, a priori, to predict whether the benefits of 
EV A™ adoption will outweigh the disadvantages and 
implementation issues. Other than a number of single­
firm or industry field studies (see, for example, 
McLaren, 1999), the major publicly-available large­
sample evidence on the evidence of EVA ™ adoption 
on firm performance is an in-house study conducted 
by Stern Stewart and Company which analyzed total 
returns to shareholders for up to five years from the 
month that the firms adopted the system. Stern 
Stewart reports that, on average, the adopters 
outperformed competitors with similar market 
capitalization by 8.55 percentage points a year, or a 
total of 50.7 percentage points of return over five 
years. A closer reading of their findings, however, 
indicate that it is also true that for the first year of 
adoption 23 out of 67 adopters underperformed their 
competitors. The corresponding figures for years two, 
three, four, and five were 28 out of 56, 19 out of 43, 14 
out of 29, 6 out of 15. In terms of the compound rate 
over the entire five-year period, 23 of 67 adopters 
underperformed their competitors. Clearly, then, 
while a portfolio of adopters may outperform their 
competitors, based on the data above, it is much 
harder to make the case that any given adopter of the 
EV ATM system will outperform its competitors given 
the 34-50% of adopters that underperform their 
competitors in any given year following adoption. 
Given this situation, we re-investigate the 
relationship between EV ATM adoption and firm 
performance. In the section below we make the case 
for the use of security analyst earnings forecasts as an 
important alternative performance measure of firm 
performance. 
Industry security analyst earnings forecasts as a 
supplement to traditional performance measures 
Historical firm performance measured alterna­
tively using stock market returns and accounting 
performance measures such as return on assets 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS), 
or earnings-per-share has traditionally been used as 
an index of firm performance. A strong case can be 
made, however, that historical accounting perfor­
mance is an incomplete measure of firm performance 
(for example Sloan, 1991; Cordeiro & Sarkis, 1997, 
Cordeiro & Sambharya, 1997). 
Historical accounting performance measures such as 
ROA, ROE, ROS and earnings-per-share measures are 
deficient because they are unidimensional and thus 
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unsuited to fully assessing firms' strategic outcomes 
and performance (Dalton et al, 1982; Ford and 
Schellenberg, 1982; Ventraman and Ramanujam, 
1986). They are also retrospective in that they reflect 
only past performance and not future performance. 
Moreover, longterm averages of past accoutning 
performance tend to suffer from increased noise-to­
informativeness ratios. Accounting performance 
measures also ignore differences in risk-taking 
between firms in their quest for profits. Managers may 
also manipulate reported accounting profits to their 
advantage, (for example to boost management 
compensation (Schipper, 1989)) and by choosing 
alternative accounting procedures within the GAAP 
framework (McGuire et al, 1986; Gomez-Mejia et al, 
1987). Some popular techniques involve switching 
between inventory policies, switching depreciation 
methods, and expense pension fund allocation. 
Finally, idiosyncratic industry-and country-specific 
practices limit the comparability of accounting 
performance measures across different product and 
country markets. 
Because of the limitations reviewed above, stock 
market performance measures such as raw or risk­
adjusted stock returns and ratios of market value to 
book value of equity are often used to supplement or 
replace accounting performance indicators. These 
measures are based on stockholders' current expecta­
tions of future performance-specifically the dis­
counted value of future cash flows accruing to the 
corporation. The discount rate used in this discount­
ing is 'risk-adjusted' in that it appropriately considers 
the level of risk associated with the firm's ventures. 
Unfortunately, stock market measures are also 
subject to important limitations. Firstly, they are 
'noisy' since they are influenced by market-or 
economy-wide forces (such as recessions, energy price 
hikes) that are well beyond management control. 
Secondly, information asymmetry (namely cases 
where managers are privy to information that is not 
available to the stockholders), may result in stock 
market performance measures being incomplete 
indices of future performance expectations since in 
efficient markets, prices only reflect information that 
is available to market participants. Such information 
asymmetry might be present, for example, in 
situations where management is reluctant to divulge 
details or even the existence of a proprietary new 
product for fear of competitor response. If stockhold­
ers are not privy to information about this new 
product, they cannot be expected to factor in its value 
in boosting future cash flows. Consequently, the stock 
price will not reflect the value associated with the new 
product. 
Industry security analyst earnings forecasts of 
future accounting performance (typically earnings­
per share) draw on detailed ongoing information-
59 
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gathering and analysis of management decisions and 
firm activities to reduce the information asymmetry 
between the firm's managers and its stakeholders. 
These analysts typically specialize in a few firms or 
industries and diligently gather various information­
ranging from corporate annual reports to plant visits 
to trade associations to specialized management 
presentations - to develop and disseminate their 
forecasts of earnings performance (Sambharya, 1995). 
This valuable ongoing monitoring function enhances 
market efficiency (Moyer et al, 1989; O'Brien, 1990). 
As Sambharya (1995) points out, analysts' 
forecasts incorporate the analysts' view of the firm's 
history, strategy, its standing in the industry, its 
interactions with various stakeholders, and especially 
important for our purposes, the expected impact of the 
firms intended strategies. These features underscore 
the validity of earnings forecasts as firm performance 
measures. 
Empirical testing demonstrates that analysts' 
earnings forecasts are valuable to investors because 
they can be used to supplement the signals of future 
performance inherent in stock prices and returns 
(Givoly and Lakonishok, 1980). Marston et al (1988) 
report that analyst forecasts provide reasonable risk 
and return estimates consistent with the predictions of 
finance theory, while Imhoff (1983) and Moses (1991) 
find that changes in consensus earnings forecasts are 
positively related to changes in stock prices and to 
cash flow. 
Unlike retrospective historical accounting perfor­
mance measures used in past compensation research, 
industry analysts' earnings forecasts have significant 
value as prospective indicators of future earnings 
performance. Fried and Givoly (1982), and most 
recently, Brown (1993) reported that analysts' 
forecasts are superior surrogate for market expecta­
tions than time-series models. It is also worth pointing 
out that earnings-per-share forecasts are less subject to 
economy-wide influences than stock market perfor­
mance measures. 
The features reviewed above make analysts' 
earnings forecasts a useful addition to traditional 
accounting and stock market performance measures 
in models that seek to identify the CEOs contribution 
to firm value. Research by Imhoff and Lobo (1984) and 
Puffer and Weintrop (1991) supports the view that 
analysts' forecasts may proxy for director expecta­
tions about future firm performance. This is reinforced 
by Chen et al (1993) findings that within the airline 
industry, analysts forecasts were the most accurate 
and reliable source of information relative to other 
information sources such as industry participants, 
academics and consultants. Recently, Cordeiro & 
Sarkis (1997), and Cordeiro & Sambharya (1997) have 
used security analyst earnings forecasts as measures 
of performance when investigating the impact of 
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corporate environmental proactivism and corporate 
reputation respectively. We follow in this tradition by 
examing the impact of EVA 1M adoption on security 
analyst earnings forecasts. 
METHODS 
The 67 adopters of EVA TM programs were 
identified from the 1999 Stern Stewart report titled The 
Superior Stock Market Performance of Stern Stewart 
Clients. These were the same firms used in the Stern 
Stewart stock market performance study. Stern 
Stewart indicates that its only U.S. clients excluded 
from the study were those with less than 12 months of 
data, a few companies that decided not to adopt 
EVA™ after beginning their implementations, and 
ones that were acquired by other companies either 
before or shortly after they completed their EVA ™ 
implementations. Using the CO-Disclosure database 
for 1997, which provides financial data on all U.S. 
firms filing with the SEC, we identified all companies 
in the 4-digit SIC codes in which these adopters 
primarily did business and screened them to ensure 
that they had at least $100 million in sales, and to 
ensure that there were no missing values on the 
variables used in the study. Our final sample 
comprised 739 firms in total, of which 63 were EVA ™ 
adopters. Four adopters were dropped due to missing 
data. The variableEVA™-Adopter is a dummy variable 
with value 1 if the firm adopted EVA TM and 0 
otherwise. 
All other measures were obtained from the CO­
Disclosure database for August 1997 which reports on 
prior financial data and provides security analyst 
earnings forecasts for future periods. Three measures 
of security analyst earnings-per-share (eps) forecasts 
were used: (a) end-of-current year eps forecast (i.e. for 
year-end 1997), (b) next-year end eps forecast (i.e. for 
year-end 1998) and, (c) next 5-year earnings-per-share 
growth forecast (in %) (i.e. over 1997-2001). These eps 
forecasts are provided to CO-Disclosure by I/B/E/S. 
Controls for firm size(operationalized as the log of 
sales to reduce heteroscedasticity), firm financial 
leverage (operationalized as long-term debt to equity 
ratio), past five-year summary eps, number of analysts 
making forecasts and the industry-average eps perfor­
mance measurewere used based on earlier research that 
has used security analyst earnings forecasts as 
dependent variables (Cordeiro & Sarkis, 1997; 
Cordeiro & Sambharya, 1997). The industry-average 
measure was computed separately for each of the 
three security analyst earnings per share forecasts 
used (separately) as the dependent variable in the 
multiple regression analyses below. 
The means and standard deviations are presented 
in Table 1. 
The following multiple regression model is 
estimated separately using ordinary least squares 
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forecast (%) 8.68 
End of year earnings-per-share forecast 1.35 
Next-year earnings-per-share forecast 1.51 
Past five-years summary earnings-
per-share 2.35 












(OLS) for each of the three operationalizations of the 
security analyst earnings forecast measure: 
Security analyst earnings forecast= a+ bl EV ATM 
adopter dummy+ b2 Firm size+ b3 Firm financial 
leverage + b4 Past five-year summary eps + b5 
Number of analysts making forecasts + b6 
Industry-average eps performance measure + 
error 
The results of the multiple regression analyses are 
provided in Table 2. Regression diagnostics revealed 
no problems with multicollinearity or 
heteroscedasticity or distribution of residuals. 
Each of the regression models explains between 
39-52% of the variance in the security analyst earnings 
forecast. The F-values are also significant at the .000 
level. The year-end and next year-end security analyst 
earnings forecasts appear to be significantly positively 
related to firm size, the number of analysts following 
the firm, the past five-year eps and the industry 
average forecast, while the next 5-year eps growth 
forecast is negatively related to firm size, and 
positively related to the number of analysts following 
the firm, and the industry average forecast only. Our 
research hypothesis, however, was not supported for 
either one of the three security analyst earnings 
forecast measures. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study attempted to test the effectiveness of 
adoption of EVA TM programs on firm performance 
where performance is measured using security 
analyst earnings forecasts. Although our results are 
subject to the limitations noted below, we believe that 
this is an important advance in the academic 
literature, especially given our careful controls for 
analyst following, firm size, leverage and industry 
effects. 
Our finding of no significant relationship between 
EVA ™ adoption and security analyst forecasts of 
future firm eps performance is somewhat surprising 
in that these forecasts would be expected to be 
correlated with investor appraisals in the stock 
market, consistent with the past research cited in the 
analyst forecast literature above. 
One potential confounding factor is that other 
firms within the EV A™-adopter' s industry may adopt 
other residual income management programs similar 
to EVA™. If these other programs also improve their 
performance, this would bias the probability of our 
finding significant results downwards. 
Another interesting possible explanation has to do 
with the fact that EV ATM measures are biased against 
firms with up-front capital commitments for future 
TABLE2 
EVA ™ Adopter Dummy 
( l=Yes; 0 =No) 
Firm Size (Ln of Sales) 
Firm Financial Leverage 
(Long-term Debt to Equity) 
Past five-years summary eps 
Number of analysts making forecasts 
Relevant Industry Average 
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growth prospects (since these firms will take a while to 
recoup their capital costs). In these firms therefore, the 
impact of EVA ™ adoption on anticipated eps forecasts 
may not be as positive or significant as on stock market 
expectations, which look not just at one or five-year 
performance expectations but the entire stream of 
future periods. Building on the findings in this 
research, we are currently investigating the differen­
tial impact of EVA ™ adoption on security analyst 
earnings forecasts when moderated by the firm's 
investment opportunity set and other contingency 
factors. 
specific contingencies that may make a difference in 
EVA™ system's ability to improve performance. 
These include industry factors such as capital intensity 
and growth rate of the firm, business factors such as 
the firm's strategic goals and drivers, management 
power and style, and buy-in, understanding and 
accountability of its employees. Future research may 
usefully focus on these factors in unearthing more 
complex relationships between EV ATM adoption and 
performance. 
There is a considerable and growing amount of 
press and management attention as well as 
stockholder money tied up in EVA ™ programs in U.S. 
firms. Given this investment, research that investi­
gates the performance implications of such programs 
should thrive well into the foreseeable future. 
It is reasonable to assume that EVA™ adoption 
may not be suitable for all firms all the time. Bowen 
and Wallace (1999), Delves (1999), and McLaren 
(1999), for example, highlight a number of firm-
62 
NOTES 
1 EVA ™ is a registered trademark of Stern Stewart & Co. 
2 "EVA: The Real Key to Creating Wealth" by AI Ehrbar, Wiley, 1998 , provides a good overview 
of EVA™ as do Ehrbar, 1999 , and Diercks and Patel, 1997 
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